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ABSTRACT: One of the challenges facing instructors of Chinese philosophy courses at many 
Western universities is the fact that students can often bring orientalizing assumptions and 
expectations to their encounters with primary sources. This paper examines the nature of this 
student bias and surveys four pedagogical approaches to confronting it in the context of 
undergraduate Chinese philosophy curricula. After showcasing some of the inadequacies of 
these approaches, I argue in favor of a fifth approach that deploys sources from the “pre-
history” of comparative philosophy, viz. documents by some of the first Western interpreters of 
Chinese thought. Such sources give students an access point to the Chinese primary source 
material that might be prima facie more culturally familiar, while also prompting them to 
recognize the limitations of that perspective. Of course, most of these early Western 
interpretations are naive, ignorant, or even blatantly xenophobic; but as Confucius stresses, 
even bad role-models can still serve as effective teachers by reminding us of pitfalls to avoid 
(Analects 7.22). Thus, if we can appreciate the failings of earlier interpretive efforts, we may 
be more cautious and open-minded in how we ourselves approach primary texts. An analysis is 
given of the hermeneutic climate of early modern European-Chinese comparativism, and 
Leibniz’s writings on Confucianism are unpacked as a specific case-study of this teaching 
strategy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1602, the Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci produced the first European-style Chinese  
world map.1 The map’s singularity earned it the nickname “Impossible Black Tulip,” a 																																																								
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1 Ricci’s authorship of the map has recently been disputed, based on several apparent oddities in its 
epigrams and topographies. For example, the Italian coastline is severely distorted and the Papal States 
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reference to the Dutch mania for such a flower. Like much of the rest of Ricci’s work 
on Chinese religion and philosophy, however, the map is a bit of a hermeneutic 
paradox: it is filled with false essentialisms, exoticisms, and forced translations that are 
culturally self-serving; yet it was also an important first step for Westerners to start to 
understand China. The teaching of Chinese philosophy today presents its own kind of 
Impossible Black Tulip. Students often bring a variety of Riccian assumptions and 
expectations to the table, and although they are frequently disabused of these when 
they confront the primary source material, they lack any explicit framework for 
contextualizing such assumptions. Like Ricci’s map, their assumptions can distort, but 
they can also be leveraged as a useful bridge to understanding biases.  
 Toward this end, in the first few sessions of my own course, before reading 
Chinese philosophy proper, I have students engage with texts from what might be 
called the “pre-history” of comparative philosophy; that is, documents by some of the 
first Western interpreters of China. The goal is to give students an access point to the 
Chinese primary source material that might be prima facie more culturally familiar, 
while also prompting them to recognize the limitations of that perspective. Of course, 
like the Black Tulip map, most of these early Western interpretations are naive, 
ignorant, distortive, and orientalizing. Several are blatantly racist or xenophobic, and 
many will undoubtedly strike contemporary scholars of Chinese philosophy as 
downright bizarre. But as Confucius remarks, education can come in unexpected 
guises: 
 
When walking with two other people, I will always find a teacher among them. I focus on 
those who are good and seek to emulate them, and focus on those who are bad in order to 
be reminded of what needs to be changed in myself. (Analects 7.22; Slingerland 2006, 21) 
 
In other words, even bad role-models can still serve as effective teachers by reminding 
us of pitfalls to avoid. So if we can appreciate the failings of earlier interpretive efforts, 
we may be more cautious and open-minded in how we ourselves approach primary 
texts. 
 This paper explores the strengths and possible limitations of this way of framing 
the curriculum of Chinese philosophy. To motivate the issue, I first reflect on the 
nature of student bias in confronting classical primary sources, and some of the various 
ways of addressing it pedagogically. After showcasing some of the inadequacies of 
these approaches, I introduce the idea of deploying “black tulip texts” as an alternative 
propaedeutic. After a brief overview of the hermeneutic climate of early modern 
comparative philosophy, I offer as a case study of this teaching strategy Leibniz’s 
writings on Chinese thought. 																																																																																																																																																																
are omitted, raising suspicions about the Ricci attribution given that he was both Italian and a Jesuit. 
Other unusual or absent labels and dates have been thought to suggest a much earlier composition 
indigenous to China. Lee (2011) suggests a date of 1430 in conjunction with the explorations of Zheng 
He. The exact authorship of the 1602 map does not impact the thesis defended in this paper. Indeed, if 
the map were in fact copied or appropriated by a Westerner from an earlier Chinese cartographer, that 
might only enhance the applicability of it as the kind of pedagogical tool described below. 
 	
Comparative Philosophy 7.2 (2016)                                                                                        DELAPP 
69	
2. WHAT HAS CHINA TO DO WITH CATHAY? 
 
In an essay on the craft of comparative philosophy entitled “What has Athens to do 
with Alexandria?”, David Hall (2002) rebuts the claim that Chinese philosophy is or 
ought to be the sole province of either philosophers or sinologists individually, but that 
instead each perspective needs the other. As he puts it allegorically, Athens (standing 
for philosophers who are comfortable engaging in speculation) and Alexandria 
(representing linguistic specialists who are more intent on textual and historical 
minutiae) both contribute valuable and mutually reinforcing skill sets to comparative 
philosophy. Hall’s message is an important one for researchers in Chinese philosophy, 
but for the majority of students, his dichotomy is a non-starter. At most Western 
undergraduate institutions, students in a course on Chinese philosophy will generally 
not have the linguistic skills to approach the primary sources as sinologists, and their 
philosophical abilities may still only be in early development. Instead, many of the 
interpretive assumptions they bring to the primary sources are drawn from random 
popular and contemporary depictions. These assumptions tend to correspond to what 
Martha Nussbaum (1997) has referred to as the two “descriptive vices” of studying 
foreign cultures: chauvinism (they’re weird and we’re better) and romanticism (they’re 
weird and they’re better). In this climate, the interpretive question for most students is 
not what Athens and Alexandria have to do with one another, but what the China of 
their philosophy curriculum has to do the orientalized entity with which they are more 
familiar, viz. something more like the Cathay of Marco Polo that was influential in the 
poetical imagination of Victorian Europe. 
 There are several ways a teacher might respond to a priori student orientalism. In 
what follows I consider four different possible approaches and their limitations. This is 
a non-exhaustive list and the approaches need not be mutually exclusive. Although the 
limitations I identify are not necessary or endemic features of the approaches (i.e. 
creative and well-prepared instructors may be able to find ways to transcend them), I 
argue that the alternate fifth approach I offer at the end of this section ultimately has 
superior pedagogical advantages on the whole. 
 One approach to dealing with a priori student orientalism could be to simply ignore 
student biases and optimistically dive right into the Chinese primary sources, confident 
that the texts themselves will ultimately disabuse readers of their prejudices. Let us call 
this the Textual Approach. I find the Textual Approach not only ineffective, but naive 
and even pedagogically irresponsible. Texts never “speak for themselves” and even if 
they could, undergraduate survey courses typically do not allow enough time on any 
given text for organic clarification to bubble up on its own accord. Moreover, part of 
what I take to be the charge of teachers of Chinese philosophy (at least at the 
undergraduate level and to Western constituencies) is not merely to deliver the contents 
of classical Chinese texts, but to cultivate more general comparative skills. 
 A second approach to dealing with student orientalism is to call out these 
assumptions directly and early in the term. Let us call this the Directive Approach. 
While this has some advantage over the Textual Approach in that it actually provides 
an explicit anti-bias interpretive framework, it can be much too tyrannical. Students’ 
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interpretive biases might be corrected, but the Directive Approach makes no provision 
for acknowledging the possibility of an instructor herself being biased. Of course, it 
very well might be that an instructor is not biased individually, but by directing 
students to a “correct” interpretation which the instructor dictates from the beginning, 
the Directive Approach provides no check or balance against potential bias: students 
are given no context for considering alternative interpretations or the possibility that 
the specific approach to which they are directed might be incomplete. 
 A third approach might avoid the limitations of both the Textual and the Directive 
Approaches by prefacing the course with explicit attention to some of the theoretical 
dimensions of hermeneutics, post-colonialism, and orientalism. We can call this the 
Otherness Approach. One of the problems with this approach, however, is that very 
few texts in theoretical hermeneutics are manageable for early-career philosophy 
undergraduates (let alone general education students), and those which might be 
manageable tend to either be overly abstract and not particular to China, or require that 
an instructor spend a lot of important class time early in the term unpacking them. 
Moreover, lengthy class periods devoted to theoretical hermeneutics at the start of a 
term not only seem overly defensive and preemptive, but are also likely to scare the 
students away from subsequently risking their own interpretations. Comparative 
philosophy courses that adopt the Otherness Approach thus run the risk of morphing 
into exclusively methodology courses. Of course, basic points from theoretical 
hermeneutics can indeed be presented in user-friendly introductory ways quite 
efficiently by adept teachers. If this material is presented too cursorily, however, or 
without unpacking the details of primary hermeneutic texts, the Otherness Approach 
threatens to simply reduce to a more theoretical version of the Directive Approach, 
except that whatever interpretive biases an instructor might have are now repackaged 
and reified with the support of an interpretive methodology that is itself directed a 
priori. Dictating to students the correct interpretation of a text is not very different from 
dictating to students the correct theory of interpretation of a text. 
 Rather than frontload a course with cumbersome theoretical material as the 
Otherness Approach does, a fourth Comparative Approach instead builds into a 
curriculum periodic points of contact, where students must critically juxtapose a 
Chinese primary source with a Western philosophical idea, or examine the Chinese 
source in light of multiple, competing interpretations presented in secondary sources. 
This is clearly the best of the four approaches, since not only does it actually involve 
doing real comparative philosophy, but it also exposes students to contemporary 
scholarship and debates. One limitation of the Comparative Approach, however, is that 
in any comparison per se, the comparanda come logically prior to the comparans, for 
there must an object of the comparing. To compare, say, Xun Zi and Hobbes, one must 
start with an antecedent familiarity with first one then the other, and then put the two 
into comparison. But since, in this way, the Comparative Approach can only be 
deployed after a primary source has been read, that leaves the initial encounter with a 
text prone to the same problems plaguing the Textual Approach, viz. insisting that the 
text impossibly “speak for itself” with no pedagogical guidance. Alternately, if it is 
attempted to position the Comparative Approach prior to reading any primary sources, 
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it would become essentially tantamount to the Otherness Approach; for “comparison” 
in the absence of comparanda would be equivalent to introducing a purely theoretical 
perspective, with all the potential limitations facing that approach that we considered 
above. 
 In summary, there are notable limitations facing each of the aforementioned 
approaches—what I have called the Textual, Directive, Otherness, and Comparative 
Approaches. This is not to say, however, that these limitations are ineliminable. 
Reflective and creative teachers of classical Chinese philosophy can perhaps find 
workarounds for some of the worries I have raised, or might combine elements of 
multiple approaches in an effort to mitigate the difficulties of each. Moreover, each of 
the four approaches does indeed have certain attractions. After all, the Textual 
Approach is undeniably a time-efficient way to dive right into the primary sources and 
it promotes a refreshing immediacy and openness to a student’s first encounter with a 
text. The Directive Approach, when used properly, can provide students with essential 
guideposts for their encounters with primary texts that can forestall wildly erroneous 
individual interpretations before they have the opportunity to fester. The Otherness 
Approach can furnish students with a theoretical framework for appreciating 
differences well beyond the classroom. And the Comparative Approach helps students 
to discover the familiar in something otherwise alien and to problematize what is 
presumed to be familiar. 
 Given the potential limitations of each approach, however, I want to propose a new 
fifth approach, which we can call the Historical Approach, and which takes Ricci’s 
Black Tulip map as a metaphor. The Historical Approach begins the curriculum of 
Chinese philosophy not by diving right into the Chinese primary sources (as the 
Textual Approach does), not by stipulating the “right way” to interpret the primary 
sources (as the Directive Approach does), and not by getting bogged down in purely 
abstract theoretical issues (as the Otherness Approach does). Rather, the Historical 
Approach begins by having students work through a specific Western text that 
represents an early interpretive engagement with Chinese thought. Opening a course in 
such a way has several pedagogical attractions. First, it showcases obvious interpretive 
errors, and so, in the spirit of the Analects passage quoted earlier (which reminds us we 
can learn even from those who are wrong), the Historical Approach helps students 
reflect on their own assumptions. Neither the Textual Approach nor the Directive 
Approach necessarily facilitate such reflection (they certainly can do so, but it is not an 
intrinsic feature of them)—the former does not because it ignores biases altogether, the 
latter does not because in dictating the “correct” interpretation to students, it restricts 
outlets for self-critique. By contrast, early Western comparative texts often have cross-
cultural attitudes which are so obviously chauvinistic or romanticist that they cannot be 
ignored. Second, the Historical Approach furnishes the opportunity to reflect on 
comparativist methodology, as the Otherness Approach does, but in a way that is 
concrete and directly relevant to China. Unlike the Otherness Approach, the Historical 
Approach is also much less likely to scare students away from later participation since 
they can see the ways in which even the best minds of Western philosophy got it 
wrong. And finally, the Historical Approach, unlike the Comparative Approach, can 
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(indeed should) be deployed right from the start of a course, before any hermeneutic 
bad habits have become entrenched. For this reason, the Historical Approach is also 
perfectly compatible with the Comparative Approach, with a course starting 
Historically and progressing Comparatively. Indeed, the two approaches are 
complementary: the Historical Approach shows that comparative philosophy is not a 
newfangled undertaking, and the Comparative Approach shows how comparative 
philosophy can and has actually made a great deal of progress. 
 Moreover, the Historical Approach can absorb many of the attractions of the other 
four approaches, while largely avoiding their difficulties. For example, the worry with 
the Directive Approach is that it insufficiently provides for mechanisms for stepping 
away from whatever interpretive framework is directed. This worry is not endemic in 
the same way to the Historical Approach. Although instructors implementing the 
Historical Approach might of course still be biased themselves, the Historical 
Approach focuses attention away from the instructor and onto the historical text; this 
text may be biased (the Leibnizian sources presented below as examples certainly are), 
but its historical nature makes such bias easier to recognize as such, and therefore 
potentially easier to mitigate. Regarding the Otherness Approach and the worry that 
frontloading a syllabus with readings in theoretical hermeneutics bogs down the 
curriculum prior to getting to the primary sources, using the Historical Approach, by 
contrast, students get to experience the interpretive orientation of the historical text in 
question without having it presented to them as objectively authoritative, insofar as it is 
explicitly the sole orientation of the historical voice in question. 
 Convinced of the advantages of this new teaching approach, I therefore want to 
offer one specific text which I have found particularly useful: Leibniz’s writings on 
China. But first, some brief historical contextualization. 
 
3. THE DOCTRINE OF THE MING 
 
Sixteenth and seventeenth-century Europe was distinctly preoccupied with China. 
After generations of unsuccessful missionary forays into the mainland, China finally 
opened its borders to the Jesuits, with Matteo Ricci being the first European allowed 
into the Forbidden City in 1601 by the Wangli Emperor (Ming Dynasty). The 
conventional wisdom attributes Ricci’s and the Jesuits’ popularity to a combination of 
their Catholic respect for tradition and learning, which resonated with the Confucian 
court (though at the expense of Buddhism and Daoism), and their scientific knowledge  
(especially in astronomy and geometry).2 For the rest of the Ming Dynasty, xixue 
(“Western learning”) became all the rage at court.3 																																																								
2 Regarding the Jesuit denigration of Buddhism and Daoism (and also especially the Song Dynasty Neo-
Confucianism of Zhu Xi, which the missionaries regarded as unacceptably materialist) see Mungello 
(1985, 68-71). For the spread of Western astronomy in China, see Sivin (1973). Mungello (1985, 25-28) 
notes that the astronomy which the Jesuits presented to the Chinese literati morphed somewhat 
schizophrenically as rapid scientific revolution was occurring back in Europe between the paradigms of 
Brahe, Galileo, and Aristotle/Ptolemy. Presumably what contributed to the positive Chinese reception of  
the Jesuits’ astronomical teachings was their more practical successes, e.g. at predicting eclipses. 
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 Of course, the cultural transmission worked in the other direction too. Ming 
theorists had advanced the idea that “outer barbarians” (waiyi) should be encouraged to 
travel to inner China in order to be “transformed” (laihua). The laihua effect on the 
Jesuit missionaries was enormous. The reports that filtered back to Europe from Ricci 
and his colleagues sparked deep philosophical and theological controversies—notably, 
the Terms Controversy (whether Chinese had a word for God), the Origins 
Controversy (whether Chinese ancient history jibed with Biblical dates for humanity’s 
descent from Noah), and the Rites Controversy (whether Confucian rituals qualified as 
“religious” observances or not). These debates divided intellectuals and Christian 
denominations fiercely. The Jesuits, for their part, urged accommodation—that is, the 
attitude of interpreting China in a way that revealed universal, trans-cultural 
commonalities.4 Yes, Chinese has indigenous words for God (shangdi, tian, etc.). Yes, 
Chinese mythology is consonant with Biblical genealogy (indeed, the Sage King Fuxi 
might actually have been Noah himself!). No, Confucian rituals are not “religious”, and 
therefore not pagan or condemnable (they are “merely” civic expressions). 
 With the transition to the Qing Dynasty in 1644, the Chinese court continued to be 
accommodating, with the Kangzi Emperor passing an Edict of Toleration for 
Christianity in 1692. In Europe, however, the Jesuits were trumped by Pope Clement 
XI who declared that Confucianism was in fact pagan and blasphemous (1707). This 
stance, however, only served to further stimulate the humanists of the Enlightenment, 
who began contrasting what they saw as Chinese secularism and naturalism versus 
Rome’s sectarianism and superstition. Christian Wolff famously lost his academic 
position after delivering a controversial lecture in 1721 comparing Confucius to Jesus 
and praising China for an ethics separated from metaphysics.5 Voltaire perfectly sums 
up the situation: “Some European writers who had never been to China had claimed 
that the government of Peking was atheistic; Wolff had praised the philosophers of 
Peking, hence Wolff was an atheist. Envy and hatred never constructed a better 
syllogism” (1764, 167). 
 Over time, the European view of China as secular fetish faded into stereotypes of 
China as static and enervated. This gradual shift from Nussbaum’s romanticism to 
chauvinism might be attributed in part to the reforms and revolutions of Europe in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which celebrated the free individual, thereby 
making the central authority of the Chinese government seem to Western 
commentators less utopian and more despotic.6 Confucianism started to get associated 																																																																																																																																																																
3  Mungello (2013, 15-52) gives a detailed overview of the Chinese acceptance of Christianity and 
European science. 
4 The terminology of “accommodation” is developed by Mungello (1985). 
5  See Louden (2002) for a more comprehensive account of the case of Wolff in relation to other 
European attitudes toward China. For analysis of Wolff’s remarks in the broader context of shifting 
Christian theology (notably the debate about voluntarism), see Larrimore (2000). 
6 Fuchs (2006) pegs Montesquieu as one of the first voices of this new attitude toward China. François 
Quesnay’s The Despotism of China (1767) is another early expression of the new chauvinism toward 
China, using its alleged totalitarianism as an argument against what he saw as a similar tyrannical strand 
in Plato’s Republic. 
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(negatively) with growing anxieties about Spinozism.7 Kant and Herder used China to 
articulate their new scientific conceptions of race. 8  Marx denigrates China as 
“vegetative” in order to highlight the initiative of the Proletariat.9 Weber recruits China 
as a foil for his Protestant Ethic.10 And of course political and economic rhetoric 
throughout the twentieth century exploited Chinese stereotypes, from the Sick Man of 
Asia to the Red Scare. 
 The point of this historiography is to emphasize that, in both good and bad ways 
and out of a variety of motivations, Europe was already doing versions of comparative 
philosophy from the very beginning of its encounter with China. By prefacing the 
curriculum of a course on Chinese philosophy with this history of European reception, 
students get to see that comparative philosophy has always been an intrinsic part of the 
Western intellectual tradition, and not some trendy modern outgrowth of political 
correctness. Moreover, many of the early modern European interpretive stances have 
echoes in the antecedent views students bring into the classroom—be it the 
accommodationist views of the Jesuits, the romanticisms of the humanists, or the 
chauvinisms of later theologians and revolutionaries. 
 Of course, the pre-history of European comparative philosophy is full of plenty of 
biases and errors. David Mungello, who has written comprehensively about the shifting 
early modern European reception of China, rightly raises suspicions about the 
hermeneutics of what I have called the Historical Approach. As he says, “Using 
another culture to support a cultural program is not the most objective way to 
understand the other culture and inevitably results in its distortion” (Mungello 2013, 
139). But given the enduring influence which this formative period of comparative 
philosophy continues to exert in popular consciousness, “objectivity” (or what 
Mungello champions as “understanding China for its own sake”) simply might not be 
the most realistic pedagogical tactic. Seeking such “objectivity” would seem to plunge 
introductory Chinese philosophy classes into analogous problems as those I have 
claimed face the Textual, Directive, and Otherness Approaches. 
 So if the pre-history of Western comparative philosophy is attractive 
pedagogically, what is the best delivery vehicle for it? Simply lecturing on the 
historical overview of European attitudes toward China in the form of generalities 
would void many of the benefits of the Historical Approach: it is boring and 
pedagogically passive; it is either comprehensive at the cost of taking up way too much 
class time, or else it is concise at the expense of being cursory and confusing; and it 
fails to develop any critical textual skills in preparation for the Chinese primary 
sources students will encounter later in the course. A much more effective way to 																																																								
7 Notably, Malebranche published a Dialogue between a Christian and a Chinese Philosopher (1711), 
using the latter as a stand-in for a strawman version of Spinozism. For an analysis of Malebranche’s and 
others’ association of Chinese philosophy with the perceived Spinozist threat, see Lai (1985). 
8 See Hsia (2001) for a closer reading of Kant’s and Herder’s attitudes toward China and race. 
9 From the New York Daily Tribune (1858), quoted in Mungello (2013, 1). One of the earliest European 
forerunners for the stereotype of China as economically stagnate seems to have been Adam Smith, who 
in Wealth of Nations (1776, ch.7) characterizes China as “long stationary.” 
10 See Weber’s Introduction to Sociology of the World Religions (1915). 
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deploy the Historical Approach is to have students work through a single, accessible, 
representative primary source from early modern Europe that can serve as a microcosm 
of the Historical Approach. 
 
4. CLAVIS SINICA 
 
We can think of such a text as a kind of pedagogical clavis sinica—a “Chinese Key.” 
Early modern European intellectuals were obsessed with discovering a clavis sinica in 
the form of a set of finite principles and diagrams by which the Chinese language and 
its classical texts could be easily decoded.11 A representative European text from the 
pre-history of comparative philosophy might help “unlock” Chinese philosophy for 
students in an analogous way. 
 In past courses, I have experimented with several candidate claves sinicae texts. I 
have concluded that many have insuperable pedagogical difficulties: Kant’s and 
Herder’s writings on China don’t really engage with Chinese philosophy, and they are 
also rather offensive to modern sensibilities. Malebranche’s Dialogue between a 
Christian and a Chinese Philosopher (1711) sounds promising—“Chinese philosophy” 
is in the title, after all—but Malebranche knew almost nothing about actual Chinese 
philosophy, and his “Chinese philosopher” in the dialogue is really just a stand-in for 
Spinoza. I have taught some of Ricci’s own works, such as excerpts from his True 
Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (1603) as well as his diary, but the former is more of a 
doctrinal catechism and the latter has no real direct philosophical content (it focuses 
more on legal, logistical, and linguistic matters). 
 One source with which I have had some success is the art genre of chinoiserie, 
which was extremely popular in the Rococo.12 For example, I have shown classes 
paintings by Francoise Boucher, delftware ceramics, Louis XIV furniture, the so-called 
“Chinese Room” at Schönbrunn Palace, etc. and have them talk about the qualities, 
adjectives, and associations that come to mind, and what these might tell us indirectly 
about European attitudes toward China at the time. This exercise is fun, but it has 
several limitations: the stylistic analyses and aesthetic descriptions can be too 
subjective, and there is nothing about the content that is particular to philosophy (either 
European or Chinese). 
 The best clavis sinica text I have settled on is drawn from Leibniz’s writings on 
China, primarily his preface to the Novissima Sinica (“News from China”), containing 
several Jesuit translations, reports, and commentaries on Chinese thought, which 
Leibniz edited in 1697. This is about a 10 page text, and I append to it brief selections 
from Leibniz’s On the Civil Cult of Confucius (1700) and Remarks on Chinese Rites 																																																								
11 Andreas Müller was one of the most notorious advocates of the clavis sinica, and claimed to have 
discovered one which he jealously safeguarded. See Müller’s Proposal on a Key Suitable for Chinese 
(1674). 
12 The art movement has remained influential even in more recent styles. The Metropolitan Museum of 
Art in New York recently devoted an exhibition to the history of chinoiserie in fashion (“China through 
the Looking Glass,” spring 2015). Apropos for this paper, Valentino even created a dress for the gala 
riffing on the Black Tulip motif.  
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and Religion (1708).13 Leibniz aficionados may also be aware of his longer Discourse 
on the Natural Theology of the Chinese (1716), which I have not found as useful 
pedagogically: it is much too long and it requires too much contextualization with 
Leibniz’s own philosophy (e.g. pre-established harmonies, monads, binary 
mathematics, etc.), through which he reads the Chinese classics. Yet, even Leibniz 
scholars may be less well acquainted with his writings on China, for they are not 
typically broached even in graduate-level encounters. Franklin Perkins confronts this 
neglect: 
 
The reason Leibniz’s engagement with China appears so surprising and worthy of 
attention is its contrast with the disinterest of his contemporaries. Yet our reaction of 
surprise should itself be surprising and worthy of attention. In the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, information from other cultures flooded into Europe, while 
Europe’s economy became more and more obviously global. In this context of 
globalization, the odd phenomenon should not be Leibniz’s writings on China but that 
everyone else showed so little interest in the world outside Europe. How could Descartes, 
so interested in the nature of “man,” show no interest in the variety of human beings? How 
could Locke, an “empiricist,” show so little interest in the experiences of non-Europeans? 
(Perkins 2004, ix) 
 
 Leibniz was enormously curious about all things Chinese. And he was regarded by 
many in Europe as one of the great authorities on China. Clergy, aristocrats, other 
intellectuals, and even linguists would write to him for sinological clarification or for 
news from the Chinese missions. He was viewed as a sort of liaison to China, and even 
refers to himself as the “bureau of address for China... because everyone knows that 
one has only to address me in order to learn some news.”14 There is thus good reason to 
read Leibniz’s writings on China for those interested in Leibniz’s own philosophy, 
since many of his epistemological and metaphysical commitments both influenced and 
were influenced by his exposure to Chinese philosophy.  
 
On a metaphysical level, [cultural] exchange is driven by the value of diversity in the best 
possible world and the derivation of diversity from variations in monadic perspectives. On 
an epistemological level, exchange is driven by the necessary limits of our own 
perspectives and the fact that monads in distant places have different and complementary 
perspectives. (Perkins 2004, 108) 
 
 More specifically, Leibniz seems most interested in China as a repository of 
recorded empirical observations, which he thinks can help inject content into otherwise 
overly-abstract Western theoretical frameworks. In this way, Leibniz’s writings reveal 
him to be deeply dualistic in how he regards Chinese philosophy, yet he sees neither 
culture as inferior to the other; or rather the West is superior in some ways, inferior in 																																																								
13 These have been annotated and packaged together in Cook & Rosemont (1994). 
14 From Leibniz’s 1697 letter to Sophie Charlotte of Brandeburg. See G.W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften 
und Briefe, Vol. 1, ed. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften (Darmstadt/Leipzig/Berlin: Akademie 
Verlag, 1923-), p.869. 
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other ways. But he sees both perspectives as necessary in order to grasp truth. 
Specifically, the following binary oppositions are evident in Leibniz: 
 
Europe   China 
   Revealed Religion Natural Religion 
   Theory   Practice 
   Science   Ethics 
   Form   Content 
 
 However, in addition to revealing an important dimension of Leibniz’s own 
thinking, his writings on China are also excellent ways to introduce students to Chinese 
philosophy generally. The Novissima Sinica preface, for example, is a goldmine for the 
Historical Approach. Not only does it afford students the opportunity to see one of the 
West’s most canonical philosophers grapple explicitly with Confucianism, but Leibniz 
also articulates a remarkable awareness of his own comparative methodology. He is 
aware, for example, of the possibility of interpretive distortion, even if well-
intentioned: “If we ever impute to Confucius doctrines that are not his, certainly no 
pious deception would be more innocent, since danger to those mistaken and offense to 
those who teach is absent” (Cook & Rosemont 1994, 63).  
 Of course, he is also not adverse to taking interpretive liberties in order to make the 
foreign seem more familiar: when dealing with an alien Chinese idea, he says in the 
Civil Cult of Confucius that “it is advisable to give it the most favorable meaning—as 
the Apostle Paul is said to have done in taking the altar erected to an unknown god as 
having been instituted by the Athenians for ties which they ought to have celebrated 
rather than for those which they usually practiced” (Cook & Rosemont 1994, 63). In 
his Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion, he rather arrogantly asserts that, “Since the 
philosophy of the Chinese has never been organized in a systematic form, and, I very 
much suspect, they lack philosophical terminology, nothing prevents interpreting what 
the ancients [of China] teach about divine and spiritual things in a more favorable 
sense” (Cook & Rosemont 1994, 72).15 And in a letter to Joachim Bouvet (a Jesuit in 
China) he claims that 
 
...in all this [interpretation] it is necessary to go with all the good faith possible, without 
any disguise, which could be prejudicial to those who are authorities among us; for it is 
certain that one will always find that one truth is in accord with another, and that the holy 
Scripture never holds anything wrong. (Widmaier 1999, 61; quoted in Perkins 2004, 121) 
 
In these passages, Leibniz makes it clear that his criteria for what makes an 
interpretation “favorable” is its consistency with Christianity (not to mention that he 
often seeks out confirmation in the Chinese classics of his own philosophical theories). 
But by being above-board about the act of interpretation itself and the possibility of 																																																								
15 Cf. Leibniz’s similar language in the Novissima Sinica preface: “As a general rule, nothing prevents us 
from thinking well of the ancient doctrines [of the Chinese] until we are compelled to proceed in other 
ways” (Cook & Rosemont 1994, 70). 
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distortion, Leibniz’s writings on China give students the chance to critically reflect on 
their own hermeneutic standards and assumptions. 
 Despite his occasional (but again, at least explicit) interpretive appropriations, 
Leibniz is also admirably sensitive to the principle of charity, advocating Ricoeur’s 
(1970) hermeneutics of faith rather than a hermeneutics of suspicion. He lays down the 
interpretive principle that foreign texts should not be prima facie construed in ways 
that would render them absurd, either to logic (Discourse 63) or to psychological 
realism (Discourse 64). If a text appears contradictory or false, one should shift to a 
more figurative reading (Discourse 33). And in general, interpretations should consider 
overall coherence and avoid taking things out of context: “To be able to speak clearly 
of their dogmas, it is safest to consider the reason and the harmony of their doctrines, 
rather than superficial utterances” (Discourse 34a).  
 Leibniz also makes an interesting case not merely for the necessity but also for the 
advantages of charitable outsiders seeking to interpret Chinese philosophy: “It is not 
absurd for discerning Europeans (such as Ricci) to see something today which is not 
adequately known by the Chinese erudites, and to be able to interpret their ancient 
books better than the erudites themselves... How often strangers have better insight into 
the histories and monuments of a nation than their own citizens!” (Cook & Rosemont 
1994, 64). If an interpretation is erroneous but nevertheless well-intentioned and 
favorable, at the very least it can still be a constructive first step in cultural exchange, 
always with the possibility of later correction (cf. Perkins 2004, 163).  
 Finally, in the Civil Cult of Confucius, Leibniz gives an inspiring call to arms for 
Western philosophers to take the task of comparative Chinese philosophy more 
seriously. He writes, “As of now, I do not know if it is sufficiently clear what in fact is 
the authentic doctrine of the Chinese literati (especially the classical ones), officially 
approved, based on their classical texts. In any event, one can hardly evaluate it 
properly in Europe until Chinese literature is no less familiar than the Rabbinical or 
Arab, so that it is possible for us to read their books and judge them critically, 
something that could indeed be done in Christendom” (Cook & Rosemont 1994, 63). 
  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Adopting the Historical Approach to confronting student biases in undergraduate and 
introductory courses in Chinese philosophy has advantages over alternate pedagogies. 
And Leibniz’s writings on China are a very effective key—a propaedeutic clavis 
sinica—for interpretively unlocking Chinese primary sources. Leibniz communicates 
important and explicit hermeneutic principles, he shows students that comparative 
philosophy is core to the philosophical enterprise and the Western canon, and he 
models interpretations that students can see are both legitimate and illegitimate. In 
doing so, Leibniz is a wonderful segue into Chinese philosophy for Western students, 
helping them feel confident but careful in constructing and defending their own 
subsequent readings. As the Jesuit missionaries in China phrased it, this cultivates in 
students the ability to “talk something into harmony” (shuohede).  
 	
Comparative Philosophy 7.2 (2016)                                                                                        DELAPP 
79	
 I have found the Historical Approach in general and Leibniz in particular very 
effective in my courses. Such an approach, however, does raise questions about under 
what conditions it is pedagogically undesirable to teach stereotypes. Many of the early 
modern European candidate texts (Leibniz included) express attitudes about China that 
are naive, quaint, or even downright offensive. For all the pedagogical advantages I 
have attributed to these texts, such outmoded interpretations and arguments require that 
an instructor work to establish a classroom culture of respect and critique. 
 Finally, although I have focused in the paper on using Leibniz to set up the 
curriculum in a Chinese philosophy course, such a Historical Approach might have 
equally effective analogs for other areas of world philosophy. Using the American 
Transcendentalists or Schopenhauer, for example, might furnish a similar propaedeutic 
“key” for a course on Indian philosophy. As with Leibniz’s writings on China and 
Ricci’s Impossible Black Tulip map, such texts distort while clarifying, enabling us to 
live Confucius’ injunction to learn from both good and bad models. 
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